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Case No. 18,076 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This action for declaratory judgment was brought in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County by Mini Spas, Inc., 
a Utah Corporation operating a massage establishment; and a 
group of masseurs. Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment on 
two causes of action. First, that the Massage Practice Act of 
1981 be construed by the Court to· permit the Division of 
Registration to create the Utah Board of Massage. Second, 
that a Writ of Mandamus be issued to compel the Division of 
Registration to create such a Board. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
There being no material facts in dispute, Plaintiffs 
and Defendants moved for Summary Judgment, which was granted 
to Defendants on both causes. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a judgment by the Court construing the 
Massage Practice Act of 1981 to eliminate the internal in-
consistency by allowing licensing of Massage Technicians 
who have engaged in the practice of massage in the State of 
Utah for five (5) years before July 1, 1981 and who meet all 
the age and moral requirements specified in the act. Further, 
Appellant seeks a Writ of Mandamus requiring the Utah State 
Division of Registration to organize a Board of Massage and 
allow the Board to carry out its functions as specified in 
U.C.A. 58-47-1 et seq. 
Alternatively Appellant seeks a remand of this case to 
,the lower court: for· determination of the· Utah State Legislature's 
intent and purpose in passing the Massage Practice Act of 1981. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Massage Practice Act of 1981 was enacted by the 
Utah Legislature in February of 1981. The purpose of the 
Act, according to this title, is as follows: "An Act relating 
to massage practice; providing for a Board of Massage; provid-
ing for licensure;and the setting, implementation and enforce-
meLt of standards for massage technicians and massage 
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establishments; and providing for an effective date." 
However, there was an oversight in the drafting of the 
Act which has prevented its implementation. The problem is 
simply that the Board of Massage is to consist of one layman 
and four licensed massage technicians (see §58-47-3 U.C.A.). 
The Board of Massage must supervise and direct the administra-
tion of oral and written examinations which all applicants 
must pass before becoming licensed massage technicians. 
Therefore, no one can become a licensed massage technician in 
Utah until passing the examinations administered by the Board 
of Massage; but the Board of Massage cannot be constituted 
unless four licensed massage technicians can be found to sit 
on the Board. At the present time there are no massage tech-
nicians licensed by the State of Utah; and this statute has 
not been implemented by the Division of Registration of the 
Department of Business regulation although the date of imple-
mentation, July 1, 1981 has passed. 
The City of South Salt Lake is currently attempting to 
regulate massage practice in spite of the fiact that the State 
Legislature has passed comprehensive legislation providing for 
the state regulation of that practice. The ordinance passed 
by the city in its attempt to regulate massage practice poses 
the real and serious threat to the appellants of actually 
regulating their chosen line of work out of existence. Once 
the Massage Practice Act is effectuated the South Salt Lake 
City ordinances regulating massage practice in conflict with 
the state scheme will be inapplicable. 
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Plaintiff brought suit for declaratory judgment in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County seeking to construe 
the state statute in such a manner as to allow its implementa-
tion. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied and 
the District Court held that the statute, §58-47-1 U.C.A., 
et seq., was not overly broad, vague, or null and void, that. 
the Court could not make changes in the wording of the statue, 
since it is a matter of Legislative Jurisdiction, no Writ of 
Mandamus could issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN PASSING THE :MASSAGE PRACTICE ACT OF 1981 THE 
UTAH LEGISLATURE'S INTENT WAS TO PASS A VALID LAW PROVIDING 
FOR THE CREATION OF A BOARD OF :MASSAGE. 
Various profession, trades and occupations in Utah are 
regulated under title 58 of the Utah Code Annotated. §58-1-l(a) 
provides: There shall be a division of the State Government 
within the Department of Business Regulation known as the 
"Division of Registration," which shall be charged with 
administering the laws regulation professions, trades and oc-
cupations as in this title provided. §5 of the same chapter 
provides: 
The functions of the Division of Registration shall 
be exercised . . . with the collaboration and assistance 
of representative committees, whether termed committees 
or boards, of the several professions, trades and occupa-
tions regulated under this title. 
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§6 (1) provides that the Director of Registration shall 
designate the numbers of the representative committees refer-
red to in §58-1-5. 
Chapter 47 of this title, the Massage Practice Act, 
outlining the requirements for the creation of a Board of 
Massage calls for the creation of such a board according to 
standard requirements established in §58-1-6 U.C.A. for 
professions, trades and occupations under the Registration 
Division. One of the standard requirements is that four (4) 
of the five (5) board members be licensed practitioners in 
good standing of the profession. However, it is apparent that 
the legislature was either ignorant of, or neglected to make 
allowance for the fact, that there are no licensed practitioners 
in good standing in the occupational category of massage tech-
nician; because it did not change the requirements for the ap-
pointment of the original Board of Massage to allow for that 
fact. This oversight has resulted in the impossibility of 
implementing the law as it is literally written. This problem 
was stated as follows in a letter dated May 28, 1981 from 
Counsel for Appellees to Counsel for Appellants: 
The problem that we are facing in trying to create 
the Board as directed in the statute is as follows: 
Up to this time there has been no licensed masseurs 
under this Act or any other state act in the State of Utah. 
(30) [now section 58-1-5 U.C.A.] calls for the establish-
ing the Board with 'licensed' massage technicians. No-
where in the Act has anyone been 'grandfathered' in, and 
before anyone can be appointed, including those that have 
been in practice for more than five years, they must be 
examined. The exam is to be given by and under the direc-
tion of the Board. We do not see how we can appoint a 
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Board of Licensed Massage Technicians when there are no 
licensed technicians to draw from. 
There have been other boards created for the purpose 
of establishing the Board, certain individuals have been 
given special status. That was not done here, nor is 
there any provision in the act where a board can be 
impaneled to give the examination to licensed individuals. 
It is not to be assumed that the legislature makes the 
practice of participating in exercises of futility by inten-
tionally passing invalid or impossible laws. On the contrary, 
our form of government requires us to recognize the fact that 
when the legislature passes a law, that is has a purpose and 
intends that law to be valid. 
The courts are obligated to make that presumption when 
dealing with statutory law. This court held in Millett v Clark 
Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980): 
It is to be observed, morover, that statutory 
enactments are to be so construed as to render 
all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and 
that interpretations are to be avoided which render 
some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd. 
609 P.2d at 936. 
In the case of Salt Lake City v Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 741 
(Utah 1977) this court held that rules of construction were 
to be used only as aids in determining legislative intent and 
were not to get in the way of putting that intent into effect, 
as evidenc·ed by the act as a whole, and wrote: 
An even more fundamental rule of statuatory interpreta-
tion helpful here is that the statute should be looked at 
in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which 
was sought to be accomplished. 568 P.2d at 741. 
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This same holding was made in the case of Osuala v Aetna Life 
& Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980), where the Court observed: 
If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or 
application of an act, it is appropriate to analyze 
the act in its entirety, in the light of its objective, 
and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the 
legislative intent and purpose. 608 P.2d at 243. 
Also, in Robert H. Hinckley Inc. v State Tax Commission, 
404 P.2d 662 (Utah 1965), in construing the legislative 
act calling for collection of sales taxes, the Court allowed a 
vendor who did business in an unusual manner to use an alterna-
tive system to the "bracket method" mandated by the State Tax 
Commission, but which did not work for this particular busi-
ness. In doing so, the Court stated, 
We cannot ascribe to the legislature an intent to 
make it impossible for a vendor to conform with 
its requirements. 404 P.2d at 668. 
Again in Curtis v Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 
1044 (Utah 1978), this Court stated: 
A sound rule of statutory interpretation is that a 
statute is presumed not to be intended to produce 
absurd consequences and that where possible it will 
be given a reasonable and sensible construction. 
This Court recognizes its duty to render such inter-
pretation of the laws as will best promote the pro-
tection of the public. 575 P.2d at 1046. 
Finally, this Court held in Greaves v State, 528 P.2d 
805 (Utah 1974): 
Because the duty rests upon the courts to determine 
the scope of the powers of all three branches of 
government, they have a special responsibility to 
exercise a high degree of caution.and restraint to 
keep themselves within the limitations of the 
judicial power, in order not to infringe upon the 
prerogatives of the executive or the legislative 
branches. In harmony with that policy, it is the 
well-established rule that legislative enactments 
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are endowed with a strong presumption of validity, 
and that they should not be declared unconstitu-
tional if there is any reasonable basis upon which 
they can be found to come within the constitutional 
framework; and that a statute will not be stricken 
down as being unconstitutional unless it appears to 
be so beyond a reasonable doubt. 528 P.2d at 806, 807. 
It appears to be the contention of Appellees herein that 
this Court has the option of leaving this law intact as written; 
but admit that it now makes no sense, and so should be ignored 
until the legislature has corrected its error. Appellants 
have cited no authority for this strange suggestion, and it 
appears from the authorities researched by Appellants that 
the only alternative this Court may have is to declare the 
statute void for vagueness. This, of course, is a result 
which neither side seeks, and one which would be to the 
detriment of all parties. 
The intention of the Utah State Legislature to pass a 
valid Massage Practice Act providing for a functioning 
Board of Massage is further borne out by an examination of 
the responsibilities given by the legislature to the Board. 
§58-47-8 U.C.A. provides: 
Any person who . . . presents a diploma or creden-
tials issued by a school of massage approved by 
the American Massage and Therapy Association or 
its successor or like institute, representing study 
as determined by the Board of up to 1,000 hours and 
who passes a reasonable demonstrative, oral, and 
written examination, conducted by and under the 
supervision and direction of the Board, in the art 
of massage by hand . . . shall be entitled to be 
licensed and to be issued a license as a massage 
technician. 
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0bviously, the Board of Massage is intended by the 
legislature to function as a viable unit with definite 
responsibilities and duties in regard to the licensing of 
massage technicians. Further, §58-47-10 gives the Board 
authority to enter into reciprocal license agreements with 
other states. §58-47-11 gives the Board the authority to 
administer examinations to candidates for apprentice massage 
technicians. After the successful completion of the examina-
tion specified by .the Board, the candidates may be licensed 
as Apprentice Massage Technicians by the Department of Bus-
iness Regulation. The Board has other responsibilities in 
the evaluation of physical or mental competence of practitioners 
(§58-47-12), discipline within the occupation (§58-47-20) and 
in formulating post-graduate requirements for practitioners 
(§58-47-15). The obvious intent of the legislature in passing 
the Massage Practice Act was to provide for ·the licensing and 
regulation of massage technicians and establishments through 
the Division of Registration and the Utah Board of Massage. 
It is equally obvious that in following the standards set 
in the General Provisions of Title 58, the legislature 
unintentionally created an impossible situation due to the 
fact that there were no massage technicians already licensed 
by the State of Utah at the time the Massage Practice Act 
was passed. The simple fact that the legislature could have 
made special provisions for the formation of the original 
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board, taking into account the fact that there were no 
licensed practitioners in Utah, but failed to do so, does 
not indicate an intent to create an impossible situation, 
but rather indicates a simple oversight. This oversight 
can be legitimately rectified by this Court, by "grand-
fathering" in a certain category of massage practitioners 
as suggested by Appellants. 
Should this Court decide that the legislative intent 
is not adequately clear for a determination at this point, 
Appellant requests the remand of this case to a lower court 
for a determination of the legislative intent. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD INTERPRET THE MASSAGE PRACTICE ACT 
OF 1981 IN HARMONY WITH THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE, AND 
IN SO DOING RESOLVE THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN TWO PROVISIONS 
OF THE ACT. 
Appellants do not maintain that all laws passed by the 
legislature are valid simply because the legislature intended 
them to be valid, but the courts must give the laws the pre-
sumption of validity. 
This Court stated in Norville v State Tax Commission, 
97 P.2d 937 (Utah 1940): 
Statutes ~uly enacted by the legislature are pre-
sumed to be constitutional and valid (citations) 
omitted). When there is ambiguity in the terms of 
a statute or when it is susceptible of two inter-
pretations one of which would render it unconstitu-
tional and the other bring it within the constitu-
tional sanctions, the Court is bound to choose that 
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interpretation which would uphold the statute, 
and to pronounce a statute unconstitutional 
only when the case is so clear as to be free 
from doubt (citations omitted). 97 P.2d at 
939. 
The Court then went on to deal with problems in statutory 
language as follows: 
As stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 
§271, at page 320: 'In the exposition of a statute 
the intention of the law-maker will prevail over 
the literal sense of the terms; and its reason 
and intention will prevail over the strict letter.' 
97 P.2d at 939. 
Quoting from Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, 
§319, the Court stated: 
A mistake apparent on the face of an act, which 
may be corrected by other language of the act, 
is never fatal. In all such cases it may, with 
propriety, be said that the context rectifies 
the error, and it is not the Court that assumes 
to correct the legislature ... The Judicial Inter-
preter may deal with careless and inaccurate words 
and phrases in the same spirit as a critic deals-
with an obscure or corrupt text, when satisfied, 
on solid grounds, from the context or history of 
the enactment, or from the injustice,- inconvenience, 
or absurdity of the consequences to which it would 
lead, then the language thus treated does not really 
express the intention and that this amendment 
probably does. 97 P.2d at 941. 
Thus we see, that the Courts have the power to determine 
ambiguities in statutes, and to 'change words or phrases in 
statutes when that is needed in order to avoid an absurdity. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, in commenting on 
when such an ambiguity exists and when the Court should exer-
cise its power to change language to effectuate a statute, 
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stated as follows, in the case of State v Rawson, 312 P.2d 
849 (Or. 1957): 
The Courts hold that even if an act is expressed in 
clear language, a conclusion may be warranted that 
an ambiguity exists if literal interpretation will 
produce an absurd result or one at variance with the 
policy of the legislature as a whole (citations 
omitted). 
From Am Jur. we quote with approval: 'An ambiguity, 
justifying the interpretation of a statute, is not 
simply that arising fr0m the meaning of particular 
words, but includes such as may arise in respect to 
the general scope and meaning of a statute when all 
its provisions are examined. The Courts regard an 
ambiguity to exist where the legislature has enacted 
two or more provisions or statutes which appear to 
be inconsistent. There is also authority for the 
rule that uncertainty as to the meaning of the statute 
may arise from the fact that giving a literal inter-
pretation to the words would lead to such unreasonable, 
unjust, impractical, or absurd consequences as to 
compel a conviction that they could not have been 
intended by the legislature.' 312 P.2d at 856. 
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to 
·ascertain the meaning of the legislature and give 
it effect, if such meaning is constitutional. In 
determining the intent many things are taken into 
consideration: language, the object to be accom-
plished, whether a literal interpretation of the 
language will lead to an impossibility or an 
absurdity, the history behind the act, and num-
erous other matters, no one of which is absolutely 
controlling as the legislative intent. It is from 
a combination of all these that the intent is 
deduced .... 312 P.2d at 857. 
This decision was followed by the Court of Appeals of 
Oregon in Baird v Electro Mart Factory Direct, Inc., 47 
Or. App. 565, 615 P.2d 335 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) where the 
Court stated: 
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Because that legislative. intent is manifest we 
must give effect to that intention even though 
to do so does violation to the literal meaning 
of its words (citation omitted). 615 P.2d at 338. 
Only if this Court cannot find a reasonable and ration.al 
means of construing this statute and making it a valid law 
which can be implemented by the administrative body responsible 
for its execution, should it be declared invalid. This Court 
stated in a 1978 case that: 
A sound rule of statutory interpretation is that 
a statute is presumed not to be intended to pro-
duce absurd consequences and that where possible 
it will be given a reasonable and sensible con-
struction. This Court recognizes it~ duty to 
render such interpretation of the laws as will 
best promote the protection of the public. Curtis 
v Harmon Electronics, Inc. 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978) 
To successfully give a reasonable and sensible construction 
to a statute the Courts are occasionally required to modify to 
some degree the lang~age found in the statutes. This Court 
would have to make a simple change in the Massage Practice 
Act of 1981 to eliminate the impossible situation dictated by · 
the literal reading of the words of the act. The change sought 
by Appellants is to strike out the words requiring massage 
practitioners who meet the moral and age requirements of the 
act and who have engaged in the practice of massage in the 
State of Utah for five years before July l, 1981, or who meet 
the education requirements, to pass the oral and written exam-
inations specified in §58-47-8 U.C.A. This simple change 
would "grandfather" in a reasonably small group of massage 
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practitioners under the act. Such a resolution of this 
problem by this Court would be in harmony with the legislative 
intent as well as generally accepted and appropriate judicial 
interpretation of statutory law. 
In giving effect to the intent of the legislature, the 
Courts may occasionally find it necessary to alter in some 
way the wording of some provision(s) of an act. Such is the 
predicament here. This has lead the Appellees to conjure up 
the constitutional principle of separation of powers which 
was summed up very succinctly by this Court in Young v Salt 
Lake City, 67 P. 1066 (1902) 
It is ture that under the constitution, powers 
belonging to one department of government cannot 
be exercised by others. Courts cannot legislate 
or make 1 aws. 
In further support of this principle, the Appellees cite 
in their Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the case of Kimball v City of Grantsville, 57 P. 1 
(1899). 
Independently of any repugnance between a legislative 
act, and any constitutional limitation or restriction, 
a court has no power to arrest its execution, however 
unwise or unjust, in the opinion of the court, it may 
be or whatever motives may have lead to its enactment. 
Accepting this as sound doctrine, as we safely may, 
would not the judicial department itself be guilty of 
transcending its constitutional power were it to 
inquire into the expediency, wisdom, or justice of 
the legislation in question in this case? 
This, in itself, would be an abuse, because it would 
be an usurpation of power by one department of the 
government which the people absolutely vested in 
another. 
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In citing this principle of the separation of powers, 
Appellees have incorrectly identified the issue. Appellants 
do not seek to undermine the principle of separation of powers. 
Appellants in no way request the Court to take upon itself 
any power properly vested in the legislative branch of govern-
ment. Rather, Appellants request that this Court exercise its 
proper function in interpreting the statutory law promulgated 
by the other branch of government. The Courts have commonly 
recognized the necessity of departing at times from the 
strict language of a statute. In Board of Regents v Gillette, 
30 N.W. 2d 296 the Court stated: 
The rule is that words may be supplied by the 
Court in construing a statute where that is 
necessary to complete the sense thereof and 
give effect to the intention of the legislature 
manifested therein. This rule is especially 
applicable where it is necessary to do so to 
present the law from becoming a nullity. 30 
N.W. 2d at 301. 
The Missouri Court stated. in Leibson v Henry, 204 S. W. 2d 
310 (MO 1947): 
It is a general rule that the courts, in the 
interpretation of a statute, may not take, strike, 
or read anything out of a statute, or delete, sub-
tract, or omit anything therefrom. To the contrary, 
it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that 
significance and effect should, if possible, be 
accorded to every word, phrase, sentence, and part 
of the act. However, there are cases in which 
words of a statute are so meaningless or incon-
sistent with the intention of the legislature 
otherwise plainly expressed in the statute, that 
th~y.may be rejected as surplussage, and omitted, 
eliminated or disregarded. (quoted from 50 Am. 
Jur. Statutes, §31, page 219) 204 S.W. 2d at 350. 
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In People v Stratton, 335 Ill. 455, 167 N.E. (Ill. 1929), 
the Supreme Court of Illinois, referring to the intention of 
the legislature in enacting a statutory provision, stated: 
In giving effect to such intention, 'words may be 
modified, altered, omitted, or supplied so as to 
obviate any ·repugnancy or inconsistency with 
the legislative intent' (citations omitted). 'In 
construing a statute the court will not be confined 
·;:o its, literal meaning. A thing within the inten-
~ion is regarded within the statute although not 
within the letter.' (citations omitted). 167 N.E. 
at 31. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also follows this 
principle as expressed in Town of Clayton v Colorado and S. RY. 
Company, 51 F.2d 977 (Tenth Cir. 1931). 
The primary rule in the construction of statutes 
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of a 
legislative body. (citations omitted). Where the 
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, 
and conveys a clear and definite meaning, resort 
must not be had, ordinarily, to rules of construction, 
but the statutes must be given its plain and obvious 
meaning. (citations omitted). 
Where, however, the language is of. doubtful meaning, 
or where· adherence to the strict letter would lead 
to injustice or absurdity, or result in contradictory 
provisions, it devolves upon the courts to ascertain 
the true meaning. (citations omitted). 
The general design and purpose of a statute should 
be kept in mind and its provisions should be given a 
fair and reasonable construction with a view to per-
fecting its purpose and object. (citations omitted). 
51 F.2d at 979. 
In the same case the Tenth Circuit also stated: 
It frequently happens that the true intention of a 
legislative body is not expressed by the language 
employed in the statute, when literally construed. 
In such cases, the intent of such legislative body 
can only be effectuated by a departure from a 
literal interpretation of the language employed. 
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Where such intention is plainly discernable from 
the provisions of the statute when considered as 
a whole, the real purpose and intent of the leg-
islative body will prevail over the literal import 
of the words employed. 51 f .2d at 979. 
In Norville v State Tax Commission, this Court cited a 
Montana case, as follows: 
When the intention [of the legislature] can be 
gathered from the statute, words may be modified, 
altered, or supplied to give to the enactment the 
force and effect which the legislature intended. 
97 P.2d at 940. 
It is clear therefore, that this Court has the power and 
the responsibility to construe the Massage Practice Act in 
accordance with the intent of the legislature which intent 
can be determined quite clearly by a reading of the entire 
act. As the North Dakota Court said in Golden Valley Country 
v Lundin, 203 N.W. 316 (N.D. 1925): 
But the legislative intention must be sought from 
the whole act, and not merely from parts of it; 
and where certain parts of an act are inconsistent 
with other provisions of the same act, then it 
becomes incumbent upon the courts to determine 
which must prevail in order to carry out the leg-
islative purpose and intention. 203 N.W. at 319. 
The intent of the Utah State Legislature would best be 
implemented under the Massage Practice Act of 1981 by 
"grandfathering" in and licensing a small category of massage 
technicians which would permit the establishment of the Board 
of Massage and the effective regulation by the state of 
massage technic.ians and massage establishments. 
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POINT III 
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS APPROPRIATE TO 
CO:MPEL THE APPELLEES TO CARRY OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN 
ESTABLISHING THE UTAH BOARD OF MASSAGE AND IMPLEMENTING THE 
MASSAGE PRACTICE ACT OF 1981. 
The construction of the Massage Practice Act of 1981 in 
accordance with the intent of the legislature would require 
action by the Division of Registration of the Department of 
Business Regulation. However, as mantfested by the letter of 
May 28, 1981 sent to Counsel for the Appellants by Counsel for 
the Appellees, the Division will take no action until instructed 
by the Court. 
The propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus 
requiring the Division of Registration to perform its duty 
is clear from this Court's disposition of the case of Archer 
v Utah s·tate Land Boa·rd, 392 P. 2d 622 (Utah 1964). The Court 
first stated that: 
[T]here appears to be ample constitutional, 
statutory, and case law authority giving and 
vesting in the several district courts authority 
to issue Writs in the nature of Mandamus when it 
is made to appear that the Administrative Board 
or officer has a clear statutory duty to perform 
a certain act and it or he refuses to do so. 
(392 P.2d at 623). 
The Court subsequently dealt with the issue of soverign 
immunity of State organs from Writs of Mandamus. The Court 
dispensed with this contention by saying simply: "We find 
no merit in this contention as applied to a Mandamus proceed-
ing." 392 P.2d at 624 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-19-
POINT IV 
THE RELIEF SOUGHT HERE BY APPELLANTS IS NECESSARY FOR 
THEIR CONTINUED OPERATION AS A LEGITIMATE BUSINESS. 
On January 19, 1981, this Court, in the companion cases of 
Redwood Gym v Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1981) and Hollingsworth v The City of South Salt Lake, 
624 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1981) held that city and county ordinances 
prohibiting the giving of massages to members of the opposite 
sex were valid, even though they might put individual mas-
sage practitioners out of business, if they were necessary to 
prohibit prostitution and other illegal acts. Within one 
month from the date of that decision, the State of Utah passed 
an alternative regulation scheme, to achieve the same overall 
goals without forcing legitimate massage operators out of 
business. That this act preempts the field is evident from 
the fact that both Salt Lake County and the City of South Salt 
Lake have since amended their massage ordinances to exempt 
those who are licensed by the State of Utah. It is of utmost 
importance to those who practice the legitimate business of 
massage in this state that the state commence the issuing of 
licenses under the act. 
In addition, §58-47-5 U.C.A. makes it unlawful to practice 
massage without a license issued by the state. It now appears 
that all those who engage in the business of massage in Utah 
are doing so illegally and may be subjecting themselves to 
possible prosecution, although that prosecution may not be 
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successful, given the correct state of the law. In the case 
of State Ex Rel. Board of Exam in Optometry v Lawton, 523 P.2d 
1064 (Okla 1974), the court, in referring to the state's 
declaratory judgment statute, said: 
The legislature intended for factual situations 
such as this to come within the confines of the 
statute. It is apparent from a reading of the 
statute that a prospective litigant need not hazard 
the breach of a particular statute as a eondition 
precedent to the bringing of an action under the 
term of the declaratory judgment statute. The 
statute provides the determination may be made 
either before or after there has been a breach 
of any legal duty or obligation. The fact that 
Lawton could be subject to criminal prosecution 
and lose his license if he were found to be in 
violation of the statute certainly renders it a 
matter of justiciable controversy. The. practice 
and business affairs of Lawton should not be inhib-
ited or held in suspense while he waits to see if 
the Board construes his office location as a 
violation of the statute, and if so, whether it 
will decide to act against him. 523 P.2d at 1066. 
As with the Oklahoma Plaintiff, Appellants herein are taking 
the risk of being put out of business or of being criminally 
prosecuted while they wait for almost another year to see if 
the legislature will act to correct its mistake, as the 
Attorney General suggests. That is just the kind of absurd 
consequence the Courts can and should avoid by using inherent 
and statutory powers to make the law work. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should enter its order construing the Massage 
Practice Act of 1981 in such a way as to allow it to make 
sense, and in harmony with the obvious intent of the legis-
lature. In the alternative, the case should be remanded to 
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the District Court for Salt Lake County for the purpose of 
taking testimony regarding legislative intent so as to allow 
construction of the act. Once such action is taken, it 
becomes appropriate to issue a Writ of Mandamus directing 
Appellees to do their statutory duties. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~O""day of March, 1982. 
W. Aridrew McCullough 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed 2 true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants, postage prepaid, to 
David L. Wilkinson, Attorney for Defendants and Appellees, 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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